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Abstract
It has been shown that neural network clas-
sifiers are not robust. This raises concerns
about their usage in safety-critical systems.
We propose in this paper a regularization
scheme for ReLU networks which provably
improves the robustness of the classifier by
maximizing the linear regions of the classi-
fier as well as the distance to the decision
boundary. Our techniques allow even to find
the minimal adversarial perturbation for a
fraction of test points for large networks. In
the experiments we show that our approach
improves upon adversarial training both in
terms of lower and upper bounds on the ro-
bustness and is comparable or better than
the state-of-the-art in terms of test error and
robustness.
1 Introduction
In recent years it has been highlighted that state-of-
the-art neural networks are highly non-robust: small
changes to an input image, which are almost non-
perceivable for humans, change the classifier decision
and the wrong decision has even high confidence [28, 11].
This calls into question the use of neural networks in
safety-critical systems e.g. medical diagnosis systems or
self-driving cars and opens up possibilities to actively at-
tack an ML system in an adversarial way [24, 18, 17, 18].
Moreover, this non-robustness has also implications on
follow-up processes like interpretability. How should
we be able to interpret classifier decisions if very small
changes of the input lead to different decisions?
The finding of the non-robustness initiated a competi-
tion where on the one hand increasingly more sophisti-
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cated attack procedures were proposed [11, 14, 21, 6]
and on the other hand research was focused to develop
stronger defenses against these attacks [12, 11, 36, 24,
14, 3, 19]. In the end it turned out that for many
proposed defenses there exists still a way to attack the
classifier successfully [5, 2, 22], with the notable excep-
tion of [19] which was shown to be empirically robust
wrt the l∞-norm. Thus considering the high impor-
tance of robustness in safety-critical machine learning
applications, we need robustness guarantees, where one
can provide for each test point the radius of a ball on
which the classifier will not change the decision and
thus no attack whatsoever will be able to create an
adversarial example inside this ball.
Therefore recent research has focused on such provable
guarantees of a classifier with respect to the l1-norm
[4], l2-norm [13] and l∞-norm [3, 15, 25, 29, 32, 31].
Some works try to solve the combinatorial problem
of computing for each test instance the norm of the
minimal perturbation necessary to change the decision
[4, 15, 29]. Unfortunately, these approaches do not
scale with normal training to large networks. Another
line of research thus focuses on lower bounds on the
norm of the minimal perturbation necessary to change
the decision [13, 25, 32, 31].
Moreover, in recent years several new ways to regularize
neural networks [26, 7] or new forms of losses [10] have
been proposed with the idea of enforcing a large margin,
that is a large distance between training instances and
decision boundaries. However, these papers do not
directly optimize a robustness guarantee. In spirit
our paper is closest to [13, 25, 32, 20]. All of them
are aiming at providing robustness guarantees and
at the same time they propose a new way how one
can optimize the robustness guarantee during training.
Currently, up to our knowledge only [32] can optimize
robustness wrt to multiple p-norms, whereas [13] is
restricted to l2 and [25, 20] to l∞.
In this paper we propose a regularization scheme for
the class of ReLU networks (feedforward networks with
ReLU activation functions including convolutional and
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residual architectures with max- or sum-pooling layers)
which provably increases the robustness of classifiers.
We use the fact that these networks lead to continuous
piecewise affine classifier functions and show how to
get either the optimal minimal perturbation or a lower
bound using the properties of the linear region in which
the point lies. As a result of this analysis we propose
a new regularization scheme which directly maximizes
the lower bound on the robustness guarantee. This
allows us to get classifiers with good test error and good
robustness guarantees at the same time. While we focus
on robustness with respect to l2- and l∞-distance, our
approach applies to all lp-norms. Finally, we show
in experiments on four datasets that our approach
improves lower bounds as well as upper bounds on the
robust test error and can be successfully integrated with
adversarial training [11, 19]. Our main observation is
that our proposed regularizer significantly improves
provable robustness evaluated with the certification
method of [32], and especially with the combinatorial
solver of [29]. We note that at the same time, models
with adversarial training alone are not certifiable, i.e.
they often have vacuous upper bounds on the robust
test error.
2 Local properties of ReLU networks
Feedforward neural networks which use piecewise affine
activation functions (e.g. ReLU, leaky ReLU) and are
linear in the output layer can be rewritten as continuous
piecewise affine functions [1, 8].
Definition 2.1. A function f : Rd → R is called
piecewise affine if there exists a finite set of polytopes
{Qr}Mr=1 (referred to as linear regions of f) such that
∪Mr=1Qr = Rd and f is an affine function when re-
stricted to every Qr.
In the following we introduce the notation required
for the explicit description of the linear regions and
decision boundaries of a multi-class ReLU classifier f :
Rd → RK (where d is the input space dimension and K
the number of classes) which has no activation function
in the output layer. The decision of f at a point x is
given by arg max
r=1,...,K
fr(x). The discrimination between
linear regions and decision boundaries allows us to
share the linear regions across classifier components.
We denote by σ : R→ R, σ(t) = max{0, t}, the ReLU
activation function, L+ 1 is the number of layers and
W (l) ∈ Rnl×nl−1 and b(l) ∈ Rnl respectively are the
weights and offset vectors of layer l, for l = 1, . . . , L+ 1
and n0 = d. If x ∈ Rd and g(0)(x) = x we define
recursively the pre- and post-activation output of every
layer as
f (k)(x) = W (k)g(k−1)(x) + b(k), and
g(k)(x) = σ(f (k)(x)), k = 1, . . . , L,
so that the resulting classifier is obtained as
f (L+1)(x) = W (L+1)g(L)(x) + b(L+1).
We derive, following [8, 9], the description of the poly-
tope Q(x) in which x lies and the resulting affine func-
tion when f is restricted to Q(x). We assume for this
that x does not lie on the boundary between two poly-
topes (which is almost always true as the faces shared by
two or more polytopes have dimension strictly smaller
than d). Let ∆(l),Σ(l) ∈ Rnl×nl for l = 1, . . . , L be
diagonal matrices defined elementwise as
∆(l)(x)ij =
{
sign(f (l)i (x)) if i = j,
0 else.
,
Σ(l)(x)ij =
{
1 if i = j and f (l)i (x) > 0,
0 else.
.
This allows us to write f (k)(x) as composition of affine
functions, that is
f (k)(x) =W (k)Σ(k−1)(x)
(
W (k−1)Σ(k−2)(x)
×
(
. . .
(
W (1)x+ b(1)
)
. . .
)
+ b(k−1)
)
+ b(k),
We can further simplify the previous expression as
f (k)(x) = V (k)x+ a(k), with V (k) ∈ Rnk×d and a(k) ∈
Rnk given by
V (k) = W (k)
( k−1∏
l=1
Σ(k−l)(x)W (k−l)
)
and
a(k) = b(k) +
k−1∑
l=1
( k−l∏
m=1
W (k+1−m)Σ(k−m)(x)
)
b(l).
Note that a forward pass through the network is suf-
ficient to compute V (k) and b(k) for every k, which
results in only a small overhead compared to the usual
effort necessary to compute the output of f at x. We
are then able to characterize the polytope Q(x) as
intersection of N =
∑L
l=1 nl half spaces given by
Γl,i =
{
z ∈ Rd
∣∣∣∆(l)(x)(V (l)i z + a(l)i ) ≥ 0},
for l = 1, . . . , L, i = 1, . . . , nl, namely
Q(x) =
⋂
l=1,...,L
⋂
i=1,...,nl
Γl,i.
Note that N is also the number of hidden units of the
network. Finally, we can write
f (L+1)(z)
∣∣∣
Q(x)
= V (L+1)z + a(L+1),
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which represents the affine restriction of f to Q(x).
One can further distinguish the subset Qc(x) of Q(x)
assigned to a specific class c, among the K available
ones, which is given by
Qc(x) =
⋂
s=1,...,K
s6=c
{
z ∈ Rd ∣∣ 〈V (L+1)c − V (L+1)s , z〉
+ a(L+1)c − a(L+1)s ≥ 0
} ∩Q(x),
where V (L+1)r is the r-th row of V (L+1). The set Qc(x)
is again a polytope as it is an intersection of polytopes
and it holds Q(x) =
⋃
c=1,...,K Qc(x). We refer to [9]
how to integrate other operations/layer types e.g. max-
pooling, residual and dense nets or other piecewise
linear activation functions like leaky ReLU.
3 Robustness guarantees for ReLU
networks
In the following we first define the problem of the
minimal adversarial perturbation and then derive ro-
bustness guarantees for ReLU networks. We call a
decision of a classifier f robust at x if small changes
of the input do not alter the decision. Formally, this
can be described as optimization problem (1) [28]. If
the classifier outputs class c for input x, assuming a
unique decision, the robustness of f at x is given by
min
δ∈Rd
‖δ‖p , s.th. max
l 6=c
fl(x+ δ) ≥ fc(x+ δ)
x+ δ ∈ C,
(1)
where C is a constraint set which the generated point x+
δ has to satisfy, e.g., an image has to be in [0, 1]d. The
complexity of the optimization problem (1) depends
on the classifier f , but it is typically non-convex, see
[15] for a hardness result for neural networks.
For standard neural networks ‖δ‖p is very small for
almost any input x of the data generating distribution,
which questions the use of such classifiers in safety-
critical systems. The solutions of (1), x+ δ, are called
adversarial samples.
For a linear classifier, f(x) = Wx + b, with C = Rd
one can compute the solution of (1) in closed form [14]
‖δ‖p = min
s6=c
| 〈wc − ws, x〉+ bc − bs|
‖wc − ws‖q
,
where ‖·‖q is the dual norm of ‖·‖p, that is 1p+ 1q = 1. In
[13] it has been shown that box constraints C = [a, b]d
can be integrated for linear classifiers which results in
simple convex optimization problems. In the following
we use the intuition from linear classifiers and the
particular structures derived in Section 2 to come up
with robustness guarantees, that means lower bounds
on the optimal solution of (1), for ReLU networks.
Moreover, we show that it is possible to compute the
minimal perturbation for some of the inputs x even
though the general problem is NP-hard [15].
Let us start analyzing how we can solve efficiently
problem (1) inside each linear region Q(x). We first
need the definition of two important quantities:
Lemma 3.1. The lp-distance dB(x) =
minz∈∂Q(x) ‖z − x‖p of x to the boundary of the
polytope Q(x) is given by
dB(x) = min
l=1,...,L
min
j=1,...,nl
∣∣ 〈V (l)j , x〉+ a(l)j ∣∣∥∥∥V (l)j ∥∥∥
q
,
where V (l)j is the j-th row of V (l) and ‖·‖q is the dual
norm of ‖·‖p ( 1p + 1q = 1).
Proof. Due to the polytope structure of Q(x) it holds
that dB(x) is the minimum distance to the hyperplanes,〈
V
(l)
j , z
〉
+ a(l)j = 0, which constitute the boundary of
Q(x). It is straightforward to check that the minimum
lp-distance of a hyperplane H = {z | 〈w, z〉 + b = 0}
to x is given by |〈w,x〉+b|‖w‖q where ‖·‖q is the dual norm.
This can be obtained as follows
min
z∈Rd
{
‖x− z‖p
∣∣ 〈w, z〉+ b = 0} (2)
Introducing δ = z − x we get
min
δ∈Rd
{
‖δ‖p
∣∣ 〈w, δ〉+ 〈w, x〉+ b = 0} (3)
Note that by Hölder inequality one has −‖w‖q ‖δ‖p ≤
〈w, δ〉 ≤ ‖w‖q ‖δ‖p, which yields ‖δ‖p ≥ |〈w,δ〉|‖w‖p . Noting
that 〈w, δ〉 = −(〈w, x〉+ b) we get ‖δ‖p ≥ |〈w,x〉+b|‖w‖p and
equality is achieved when one has equality in the Hölder
inequality.
For the decision boundaries in Q(x), with c =
arg max
r=1,...,K
f
(L+1)
r (x), we define the quantity dD(x) as
min
s=1,...,K
s6=c
∣∣∣ 〈V (L+1)c − V (L+1)s , x〉+ a(L+1)c − a(L+1)s ∣∣∣∥∥∥V (L+1)c − V (L+1)s ∥∥∥
q
.
Lemma 3.2. If dD(x) ≤ dB(x), then dD(x) is the
minimal lp-distance of x to the decision boundary of
the ReLU network f (L+1).
Proof. First we note that dD(x) is the distance of x to
the decision boundary for the linear multi-class classi-
fier g(x) = V (L+1)x+ a(L+1) which is equal to f (L+1)
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Figure 1: Left: the input x is closer to the boundary of the poly-
tope Q(x) (black) than to the decision boundary (red). In this case
the smallest perturbation that leads to a change of the decision lies
outside the linear region Q(x). Right: the input x is closer to
the decision boundary than to the boundary of Q(x), so that the
projection of the point onto the decision hyperplane provides the
adversarial example with the smallest norm.
on Q(x). If dD(x) ≤ dB(x) then the point realizing the
minimal distance to the decision boundary dD(x) is
inside Q(x) and as dD(x) < dB(x) there cannot exist
another point on the decision boundary of f (L+1) out-
side of Q(x) having a smaller lp-distance to x. Thus
dD(x) is the minimal lp-distance of x to the decision
boundary of f (L+1).
The next theorem combines both results to give a
lower bound or the optimal solution to the optimization
problem (1).
Theorem 3.1. We get the following robustness guar-
antees:
1. If dB(x) ≤ dD(x), then dB(x) is a lower bound on
the minimal lp-norm of the perturbation necessary
to change the class (optimal solution of (1)).
2. If dD(x) ≤ dB(x), then dD(x) is equal to the mini-
mal lp-norm necessary to change the class (optimal
solution of optimization problem (1)).
Proof. If dB(x) ≤ dD(x), then the ReLU classifier does
not change on Bp(x, dB(x)) and thus dB(x) is a lower
bound on the minimal lp-norm perturbation necessary
to change the class. The second statement follows
directly by Lemma 3.2.
In Figure 1 we illustrate the different cases for p = 2.
On the left hand side dB(x) < dD(x) and thus we get
that on the ball B2(x, dB(x)) the decision does not
change, whereas in the rightmost plot we have dD(x) <
dB(x) and thus we obtain the minimum distance to the
decision boundary. Using Theorem 3.1 we can provide
robustness guarantees for every point and for some even
compute the optimal robustness guarantees. Finally,
we describe in the appendix (Section A.2) how one
can improve the lower bounds by checking neighboring
regions of Q(x). Compared to the bounds of [32, 31]
ours are slightly worse (see Table 4 in the appendix).
However, our bounds can be directly maximized and
have a clear geometrical meaning and thus motivate
directly a regularization scheme for ReLU networks
which we propose in the next section.
4 Large margin and region boundary
regularization
Using the results of Section 3, a classifier with guaran-
teed robustness requires large distance to the bound-
aries of the linear region as well as to the decision
boundary. Even the optimal guarantee (solution of
(1)) can be obtained in some cases. Unfortunately, as
illustrated in Figures 2a and 2c for simple one hid-
den layer networks, the linear regions Q(x) are small
for normally-trained networks and thus no meaningful
guarantees can be obtained. Thus we propose a new
regularization scheme which simultaneously aims for
each training point to achieve large distance to the
boundary of the linear region it lies in, as well as to
the decision boundary. Using Theorem 3.1 this di-
rectly leads to non-trivial robustness guarantees of the
resulting classifier.
However, note that just maximizing the distance to the
decision boundary might be misleading during training
as this does not discriminate between points which are
correctly (correct side of the decision hyperplane) or
wrongly classified (wrong side of the decision hyper-
plane). Thus we introduce the signed version of dD(x),
where y is the true label of the point x,
dD(x) = min
s=1,...,K
s6=y
f
(L+1)
y (x)− f (L+1)s (x)∥∥∥V (L+1)y − V (L+1)s ∥∥∥
q
. (4)
Please note that if dD(x) ≥ 0, then x is correctly
classified, whereas dD(x) < 0 if x is wrongly classi-
fied. If |dD(x)| ≤ dB(x), then it follows from Lemma
3.2 that |dD(x)| is the distance to the decision hyper-
plane. If |dD(x)| > dB(x) this does not need to be any
longer true, but |dD(x)| is at least a good proxy as∥∥∥V (L+1)y − V (L+1)s ∥∥∥
q
is an estimate of the local cross
Lipschitz constant [13]. Finally, we propose to use the
following regularization scheme:
Definition 4.1. Let x be a point of the training set
and define the Maximum Margin Regularizer (MMR)
for x, for some γB , γD ∈ R++, as
MMR(x) = max
(
0, 1− dB(x)
γB
)
+max
(
0, 1− dD(x)
γD
)
.
(5)
The MMR penalizes distances to the boundary of the
polytope if dB(x) ≤ γB and positive distances (x is
correctly classified) if dD(x) ≤ γD. Notice that wrongly
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classified points are always penalized. The part of the
regularizer corresponding to dD(x) has been suggested
in [10] in a similar form as a loss function for general
neural networks without motivation from robustness
guarantees. They have an additional loss penalizing
difference in the outputs with respect to changes at
the hidden layers which is completely different from
our geometrically motivated regularizer penalizing the
distance to the boundary of the linear region. The
choice of γB , γD allows different trade-off between the
terms. In particular γD < γB (stronger maximization
of dB(x)) leads to more points for which the optimal
robustness guarantee (case dD(x) ≤ dB(x)) can be
proved.
For practical reasons, we also propose a variation of
our MMR regularizer in (5):
kMMR(x) = 1
kB
kB∑
i=1
max
(
0, 1− d
i
B(x)
γB
)
+ 1
kD
kD∑
i=1
max
(
0, 1− d
i
D(x)
γD
)
,
(6)
where diB(x) is the distance of x to the i-th closest
hyperplane of the boundary of the polytope and diD(x)
is the analogue for the decision boundaries. Basically,
we are optimizing, instead of the closest decision hy-
perplane, the kD-closest ones and analogously the kB-
closest hyperplanes defining the linear region Q(x) of x.
This speeds up the training time as more hyperplanes
are moved in each update. Moreover, when deriving
lower bounds using more than one linear region, one
needs to consider more than just the closest boundary
hyperplane. Finally, many state-of-the-art schemes for
proving lower bounds [29, 32, 31] work well only if the
activation status of most neurons is constant for small
changes of the points. This basically amounts to ensure
that all the hyperplanes are sufficiently far away, which
is exactly what our regularization scheme is aiming at.
Thus our regularization scheme also helps to achieve
state-of-the-art provable robustness with other certifica-
tion methods ([29, 32]). This is also the reason why the
term pushing the polytope boundaries away is essential.
Just penalizing the distance to the decision boundary
is not sufficient to prove good lower bounds on the
minimal distance to the decision boundary as we will
show in our experiments (Table 2). Compared to the
regularization scheme in [32] using a dual feasible point
of the robust loss, our approach has a direct geometric
interpretation and allows to derive the exact minimal
perturbation for some fraction of the test points vary-
ing from dataset to dataset but it can be as high as
99%. In practice, we gradually decrease kB and kD in
(6) during training so that only the closest hyperplanes
of each training point influence the regularizer.
(a) (b)
(c) (d)
Figure 2: The effects of MMR. Top row: we train two networks
with one hidden layer, 100 units, on 128 points belonging to two
classes (red and blue). Figure 2a shows the points and how the input
space is divided in regions on which the classifier is linear. Figure
2b is the analogue for our MMR regularized model. Bottom row:
we show region boundaries (one hidden layer, 1024 units) on a 2D
slice of R784 spanned by three random points from different classes
of the MNIST training set. We observe a clear maximization of the
linear regions for the MMR-regularized case (Figure 2d) versus the
non-regularized case (Figure 2c).
Thus, denoting the cross entropy loss CE(f(x), y), the
final objective of our models is
1
n
n∑
i=1
CE(f(xi), yi) + λ kMMR(xi), (7)
where (xi, yi)ni=1 is the training data and λ ∈ R+ the
regularization parameter. Figure 2 shows the effect of
the regularizer. Compared to the unregularized case
the size of the linear regions is significantly increased.
5 Experiments
5.1 Main experiments
We provide a variety of experiments aiming to show
the state-of-the-art performance of MMR to achieve
provably robust classifiers. We make our code and mod-
els publicly available1. We use four datasets: MNIST,
German Traffic Signs (GTS) [27], Fashion MNIST [34]
and CIFAR-10. We consider in the paper robustness
wrt to both l2 and l∞ distances. We use two criteria.
First, upper and lower bounds on the robust test error
for a given threshold , that is the largest achievable
1https://github.com/max-andr/
provable-robustness-max-linear-regions
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Table 1: Comparison of different methods regarding robustness. We here report the statistics of 6 training schemes: plain (usual
training), at (adversarial training [19]), KW [32], Xiao et al [35], MMR (ours), and MMR+at (MMR plus adversarial training). We show, in
percentage, test error (TE), lower (LB) and upper (UB) bounds on the robust test error at the threshold  indicated for each dataset. The
robustness statistics are computed on the first 1000 points of the respective test sets for l∞-robustness, on the full test set for l2-robustness.
KW models marked with * are taken from [32, 33], while the other are retrained according to the available code (but the bounds are again
evaluated with the discussed combination of multiple techniques). The results and bounds of Xiao et al are taken directly as reported in
[35]. The model indicated by 1 has been obtained at epoch 50 instead of 100 due to optimization issues.
l∞-norm robustness l2-norm robustness
training FC1 CNN FC1 CNN
scheme TE LB UB TE LB UB TE LB UB TE LB UB
MNIST  = 0.1  = 0.3
plain 1.44 93.0 100 0.91 74.0 100 1.73 9.7 66.3 0.85 3.1 100
at 0.92 10.0 99.0 0.82 3.0 100 1.15 2.6 16.9 0.87 1.8 100
KW 3.19 10.9 10.9 1.26* 4.4 4.4 1.19 2.4 5.2 1.11 2.2 6.0
Xiao et al - - - 1.32 4.9 5.7 - - - - - -
MMR 2.11 22.5 24.9 1.65 6.0 6.0 2.40 5.9 8.8 2.57 5.8 11.6
MMR+at 2.04 14.0 14.1 1.19 3.6 3.6 1.77 3.8 6.4 2.121 4.6 9.7
F-MNIST  = 0.1  = 0.3
plain 9.49 100 100 9.50 96.0 100 9.70 42.8 91.8 9.32 57.1 100
at 11.69 29.5 95.5 11.54 21.5 73.0 9.15 19.9 61.4 8.10 20.4 100
KW 21.31 32.8 32.8 21.73* 32.4 32.4 11.24 17.2 22.7 13.08 18.5 21.7
MMR 18.11 37.6 42.0 14.52 33.2 33.6 13.28 25.0 28.0 12.85 25.4 35.3
MMR+at 15.84 31.3 34.8 14.50 26.6 30.7 12.12 19.7 23.4 13.42 26.2 39.1
GTS  = 4/255  = 0.2
plain 12.72 61.0 77.0 7.11 63.0 99.5 12.24 37.5 44.7 6.78 33.3 99.2
at 9.33 34.5 48.5 6.84 29.5 81.0 13.55 33.1 43.2 8.75 23.8 98.6
KW 13.99 33.0 33.0 15.56 36.1 36.6 16.84 16.9 31.2 14.33 28.7 34.7
MMR 14.29 39.8 39.8 13.31 49.5 49.6 14.55 33.2 34.7 14.22 36.2 36.9
MMR+at 13.10 33.1 35.4 14.88 38.3 38.4 13.94 29.7 32.1 15.35 32.1 33.2
CIFAR-10  = 2/255  = 0.1
plain - - - 24.63 91.0 100 - - - 23.31 47.2 100
at - - - 27.04 52.5 88.5 - - - 25.82 35.8 100
KW - - - 38.91* 46.6 48.0 - - - 40.24 43.9 49.0
Xiao et al - - - 38.88 50.1 54.1 - - - - - -
MMR - - - 34.61 57.5 61.0 - - - 40.92 50.6 57.1
MMR+at - - - 35.38 47.9 54.2 - - - 37.75 43.9 53.3
test error if every test input can be modified with a
perturbation δ such that ‖δ‖p ≤  and δ is chosen so
that x + δ is classified wrongly. Second, we show in
Section 5.2 and in the appendix results for lower and
upper bounds on the minimal ‖δ‖p from (1).
Lower bounds on the robust test error for l2 and l∞
are computed using the attack via Projected Gradient
Descent (PGD) [19]. Upper bounds on the robust
test error are computed using the approach of [32].
Additionally, [29] yields upper and lower bounds on the
robust test error via mixed integer programming (MIP).
We use the solver for the MIP [29] with a timeout of
120s per point, that is if the point has not been verified
in this time the solver is stopped. This technique is
currently effective for l∞ but not for l2, where basically
in almost every case the timeout is reached and thus we
discard for l2 the MIP evaluation. Finally, we combine
the upper bounds on the robust test error found by
[32] and [29] by counting the fraction of points that
can be certified with at least one of the two methods.
We compare our own guarantees from Theorem 3.1
with the ones of [32] in the appendix. Moreover, we
also combine the lower bounds on the robust test error
found by PGD, the MIP and the attack of [8, 9].
We compare six methods: plain training, adversarial
training of [19] which has been shown to significantly
increase robustness, the robust loss of [32] which sup-
ports both l2 and l∞ norms (denoted as KW), the
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Figure 3: Verifiability of models. We show the runtime (left) in
minutes that MIP [29] takes to verify 1000 points, setting a timeout
of 120s (that is the mixed-integer optimization stops anyway after
the time limit is reached), with models trained with different val-
ues of λ (see Equation (7)). Note that a logarithmic scale is used
on the y-axis. Moreover, we report (right) lower (red) and upper
(green) bounds on robust test error. The plain model, trained with-
out MMR (λ = 0) needs 51 times more to be verified, with only 1%
of the points certified. Conversely, even with a light MMR regular-
ization lower and upper bounds are tight.
training scheme of [35] (denoted as Xiao et al), our
regularization scheme MMR and MMR together with
adversarial training again as in [19]. All schemes are
evaluated on a one hidden layer fully connected net-
work with 1024 hidden units (FC1) and a convolutional
network (CNN) with 2 convolutional and 2 dense layers
as used in [32]. For more details see Appendix B. Note
that since code for [35] is not available, we just show
the l∞ results from their paper (evaluated on full test
sets with PGD lower bounds, and MIP upper bounds),
which are available only for MNIST and CIFAR-10 for
the same CNN architecture.
Improvement of robustness: The results can be
found in Table 1. For CIFAR-10 we show only CNN
models as fully connected networks do not have good
test performance. We report clean test error, lower
and upper bounds on robust test error at the threshold
indicated in Table 1, computed on 1000 points for l∞,
and on the full test sets for l2 (as we do not do the
MIP evaluation there).
Both KW and MMR+at achieve similar performance
regarding lower and upper bounds on the robust test
error. For l∞ our MMR+at achieves overall better
performance than KW, sometimes with significantly
better clean test error like on F-MNIST. In some cases,
e.g. on CIFAR-10, MMR+at provides slightly worse
upper bounds, but instead preserves better test error.
For l2 KW performs better than MMR+at with the
exception of GTS. This is to be expected as we use for
the evaluation of the upper bounds on the robust test
error the approach of [32] which are directly optimized
by their robust training procedure. Note that both
KW and MMR/MMR+at outperform by large mar-
gin plain and adversarial training regarding provable
robustness (upper bounds on the robust test error).
With the exception of the CNN-l2 models for MNIST
and F-MNIST, the upper bound on robust test error of
MMR+at is smaller than the lower bound of the plain
model. Thus our models are provably better than the
plain models regarding robust test error. Moreover,
regarding robustness wrt to l∞ the gaps between lower
and upper bounds are often very small for KW and
MMR/MMR+at showing that both techniques lead to
models which are easier to check via the MIP which
we discuss next in more detail.
Enhancing verifiability: A key aspect of any robust
training should be the ability of producing models
both resistant to adversarial manipulation and being
verifiable, in the sense of having guarantees on the
minimal perturbation changing the decision for a test
input. In fact, even if empirically model seems to be
robust, only computing certificates allows to completely
trust it. In our experiments, we could use successfully
the method of [32] to get meaningful guarantees, which
so far, as noted in [25], could be achieved only on models
provided by the specific training of [32]. Moreover, the
MIP is too slow to run on standard models, so that ad
hoc techniques have been developed to train classifiers
verifiable by MIP [35]. Our MMR training produces
also models which can be checked by MIP. This is
due to the fact that the hyperplanes representing the
boundary of the polytope are actually the boundary
between the different regimes (identity or zero function)
of ReLU units, so that pushing the hyperplanes implies
that many inputs of ReLU units have constant sign
in a wide region around the data points (and having
ReLU units with unstable signs is the main slowdown
factor for the MIP solver).
In this context, [35] develop a specific technique aiming
at inducing stability of ReLU signs. Therefore, we
provide a comparison of MMR to the ReLU-stability
loss of [35] in Table 1. On MNIST our MMR+at model
of the same CNN architecture has much tighter upper
bounds on the robust error – 3.6% compared to 5.7% of
Xiao et al. Moreover, we have no gap between the lower
and upper bounds on the robust test error, and our
upper bounds are lower than the lower bounds of Xiao
et al. This suggests that our training scheme is better at
both improving robustness and enhancing verifiability
than the approach of Xiao et al [35]. Additionally, on
CIFAR-10 we have similar upper bounds, but better
test error and better lower bounds.
To illustrate the speedup in verification time for MMR
models, we show in Figure 3 the time MIP needs to
run on 1000 points (with timeout of 120s per point)
and lower and upper bounds on robust test error wrt
l∞-distance at  = 0.1. We use CNNs trained on
MNIST with γB = γD = 0.15 and different values of λ
representing the weight of our regularizer in the loss
(7) (for λ = 0 one gets the plain model). It is clear that
MIP performs poorly both in runtime (almost 2000
minutes) and performance (LB=1%, UB=100%) on
the plain model. In contrast, the MMR models are
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verified quickly (between 35 and 79 minutes) and almost
completely (the rate of certified points is between 99.3%
and 100%), that is lower and upper bounds are close
or even equal. Please note that both statistics improve
with increasing λ up to 2, while runtime gets worse
with a larger value (as at λ = 3 the classifier becomes
less robust and then requires a higher computational
effort to be certified).
5.2 Further experiments
We present a series of experiments for a detailed un-
derstanding of how MMR works. For this section we
consider models trained to be l2-robust and evaluate
robustness as the average l2-norm of the perturbations
necessary to change the class. Lower bounds on this per-
turbation are computed either with [32] or our method
(Theorem 3.1), while upper bounds are provided by
Carlini-Wagner l2-attack (CW) [6]. We also introduce
a second fully connected architecture, FC10, with 10
hidden layers (see Appendix for details).
Importance of linear regions maximization: In
order to highlight the importance of both parts of the
MMR regularization, i) penalization of the distance
to decision boundary and ii) penalization of the dis-
tance to boundary of the polytope, we train, for each
dataset/architecture, models penalizing only the dis-
tance to the decision boundary, that is the second term
in the r.h.s. of (5) and (6). We call this partial regular-
izer MMR-dD, in contrast to the full version MMR-full.
Then we compare the lower and upper bounds on the
solution of (1) for MMR-dD and MMR-full models.
For a fair comparison we consider models with similar
test error. We clearly see in Table 2 that the lower
bounds, computed by the method presented in [32],
are always significantly better when MMR-full is used,
while the behavior of the upper bounds does not clearly
favor one of the two. This result shows that in order to
get good lower bounds one has to increase the distance
of the points to the boundaries of the polytope.
Guaranteed optimal solutions via MMR: Theo-
rem 3.1 provides a simple and efficient way to obtain in
certain cases the solution of (1). Although for normally
trained networks the conditions are rarely satisfied, we
show in Table 3 that for the MMR-models for fully
connected networks for a significant fraction of the
test set we obtain the globally optimal solution of (1),
that is the true l2-robustness. Moreover, we report
how much better our globally optimal solutions are
compared to the lower bounds of [32]. Interestingly,
we can provably get the true robustness for around
10% of points for F-MNIST and for over 98% of the
points on GTS for the case of fully connected networks.
For these cases the optimal solutions have roughly 7%
larger l2-norm for F-MNIST and 0.5% larger for GTS
points number
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Figure 4: We report the descending sorted ratios ‖δCW ‖2/‖δopt‖2
(norm of the outcomes of CW-attack divided by the norm of minimal
adversarial examples) with regard to a FC1 model on GTS dataset
trained with our regularizer.
than the lower bounds. Note that currently the MIP
[29] is not efficient for l2 even though there is room
for improvement. Globally optimal solutions for larger
networks achieved via our method can serve as a test
both for lower and upper bounds. This is an impor-
tant issue as currently large parts of the community
relies just on upper bounds of robustness using attack
schemes like the CW-attack which we address in the
the next paragraph.
Evaluation of CW-attack: The CW-attack [6]
which we use for our upper bounds in Tables 2 and 5
is considered state-of-the-art. Thus it is interesting to
see how close it is to the globally optimal solution. On
GTS FC1 we find for the MMR model with best test
error from Table 5 the globally optimal solution of (1)
for 12596 out of 12630 test points. We compare on this
subset the optimal norm ‖δopt‖2 to ‖δCW ‖2 obtained
by the CW-attack and plot the ratios ‖δCW ‖2/‖δopt‖2
in descending order in Figure 4 (note that we trun-
cate at 4000 points). While the CW-attack performs
in general well, there are 2330 points (18.5% of the
test set) where the CW-attack has at least 10% larger
norms and 1145 points (around 9.1%) with at least
20% larger norms. The maximal relative difference is
235%. Thus at least on a pointwise basis evaluating
robustness with respect to an attack scheme can signifi-
cantly overestimate robustness, see also [8]. This shows
the importance of techniques to prove lower bounds.
Moreover, the time to compute the adversarial exam-
ples by the CW-attack is 16327s, while our technique
provides both lower bounds and optimal solutions in
1701s.
6 Conclusion
We have introduced a geometrically motivated regu-
larization scheme which leads to models which are
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Table 2: Full version of MMR is necessary. We compare the statistics of models trained with the full version of MMR as in (5) and (6)
(left) and with only the second part penalizing the distance to the decision boundary (right). While the test error is for the full test set, the
lower and upper bounds on the l2-norm of the optimal adversarial manipulation are compared on the first 1000 points of the test set. One
can clearly see that the lower bounds improve significantly when one uses the full MMR regularization.
MMR-full MMR-dD
dataset model test error lower bounds upper bounds test error lower bounds upper bounds
MNIST FC1 1.51% 0.69 1.69 0.93% 0.35 1.69FC10 1.87% 0.48 1.48 1.21% 0.20 1.62
GTS FC1 11.15% 0.69 0.69 12.09% 0.48 0.63FC10 12.82% 0.64 0.67 12.41% 0.12 0.48
F-MNIST FC1 10.22% 0.50 0.85 9.83% 0.31 1.30FC10 11.73% 0.68 1.18 10.32% 0.13 1.15
Table 3: Occurrence of guaranteed optimal solutions. For each dataset and architecture we report the percentage of points of the test
set for which we can compute the guaranteed optimal solution of (1) for models trained without (plain setting) and with MMR regularization.
We show the test error of the models as well. In most of the fully connected cases, we achieve certified optimal solutions for a significant
fraction of the points without degrading significantly, or sometimes improving, the test error. Moreover, where we have a meaningful number
of points with provable minimal perturbation, it is interesting to check how much worse the lower bounds computed by [32] (LB) are. Thus
the column opt vs LB indicates, in percentage, how much larger the l2-norm of the optimal solution of (1) is compared to its lower bound,
explicitly
(
‖δopt‖2/LB − 1
)
× 100%.
MMR training plain training
dataset model test error optimal points opt vs LB test error optimal points
MNIST FC1 1.51% 0.20% 14.11% 1.59% 0.02%FC10 1.87% 0.06% - 1.81% 0.02%
CNN 1.17% 0.00% - 0.97% 0.00%
GTS FC1 11.15% 99.97% 0.59% 12.27% 1.12%FC10 12.82% 94.86% 0.66% 11.28% 0.14%
CNN 7.40% 0.00% - 6.73% 0.00%
F-MNIST FC1 10.22% 11.22% 6.53% 9.61% 0.37%FC10 11.73% 9.90% 7.27% 10.53% 0.04%
CNN 10.30% 0.09% - 8.86% 0.00%
provably robust according to the current state-of-the-
art certification methods of [32, 29]. In particular, it
performs as well as the state-of-the-art models of [32]
in terms of certified robust test error, and better or
similarly to [35]. Finally, our method based on the
linear regions allows to obtain the globally minimal ad-
versarial perturbation in a significant fraction of cases
for large fully connected networks which can be used
to test lower and upper bounds.
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A Improving lower bounds
A.1 Integration of box constraints into
robustness guarantees
Note that in many applications the input space is not
full Rd but a certain subset C due to constraints e.g.
images belong to C = [0, 1]d. These constraints typi-
cally increase the norm of the minimal perturbation in
(1). Thus it is important to integrate the constraints in
the generation of adversarial samples (upper bounds) as
done e.g. in [6], but obviously we should also integrate
them in the computation of the lower bounds which is
in our case based on the computation of distances to
hyperplanes. The computation of the lp-distance of y
to a hyperplane (w, b) has a closed form solution:
min{‖y − x‖p | 〈w, x〉+ b = 0} =
| 〈w, y〉+ b|
‖w‖q
, (8)
The additional box constraints lead to the following
optimization problem,
min{‖y − x‖p | 〈w, x〉+ b = 0, x ∈ [0, 1]d}, (9)
which is convex but has no analytical solution. However,
its dual is just a one-dimensional convex optimization
problem which can be solved efficiently. In fact a refor-
mulation of this problem has been considered in [13],
where fast solvers for p ∈ {1, 2,∞} are proposed. More-
over, when computing the distance to the boundary
of the polytope or the decision boundaries one does
not need to solve always the box-constrained distance
problem (9). It suffices to compute first the distances
(8) as they are smaller or equal to the ones of (9) and
sort them in ascending order. Then one computes the
box-constrained distances in the given order and stops
when the smallest computed box-constrained distance
is smaller than the next original distance in the sorted
list. In this way one typically just needs to solve a very
small fraction of all box-constrained problems. The
integration of the box constraints is important as the
lower bounds improve on average by 20% and this can
make the difference between having a certified optimal
solution and just a lower bound.
A.2 Checking neighboring regions
In order to improve the lower bounds we can use not
only the linear region Q(x) where x lies but also some
neighboring regions. The following description is just
a sketch as one has to handle several case distinctions.
Let x be the original point and H = {pi1, ..., pin} the
set of hyperplanes defining the polytope Q(x) sorted
so that dC(x, pii) < dC(x, pij) if i < j, where dC is the
distance including box constraints. If we do not directly
get the guaranteed optimal solution, we get an upper
bound (u, namely the distance to the decision boundary
inside Q(x)) and a lower bound for the norm of the
adversarial perturbation (l = dC(x, pi1)). If l < u, we
can check the region that we find on the other side of
pi1. In order to get the corresponding description of
the polytope on the other side, we just have to change
the corresponding entry in the activation matrix Σ
of the layer where pi1 belongs to and recompute the
hyperplanes of the new linear region R. Solving (1)
on the second region we get a new upper bound if the
distance of x to the decision boundary in R is smaller
than u. Moreover we update H with the hyperplanes
given by the second region. Finally, if u < dC(x, pi2)
then u is the optimal solution, otherwise l = dC(x, pi2)
and we can repeat this process with the next closest
hyperplane. At the moment we stop after checking
maximally 5 neighboring linear regions.
B Main experiments
B.1 Experimental details
By FC1 we denote a one hidden layer fully connected
network with 1024 hidden units. By FC10 we denote
a 10 hidden layers network that has 1 layer with 124
units, seven layers with 104 units and two layers with
86 units (so that the total number of units is again
1024). The convolutional architecture that we use is
identical to [32], which consists of two convolutional
layers with 16 and 32 filters of size 4 × 4 and stride
2, followed by a fully connected layer with 100 hidden
units. For all experiments we use batch size 128 and
we train the models for 100 epochs. Moreover, we
use Adam optimizer [16] with the default learning rate
0.001 for all models except for the l2 models on MNIST
and F-MNIST where we use the learning rate of 10−4
for MMR and 5 · 10−5 for MMR+at. We also reduce
the learning rate by a factor of 10 for the last 10 epochs.
On CIFAR-10 dataset we apply random crops and ran-
dom mirroring of the images as data augmentation.
For training we use MMR regularizer in the formulation
(6) with kD equal to the number of classes, and with
kB linearly (wrt the epoch) decreasing from 10% to 2%
of the total number of hidden units of the particular
network architecture. We also use a training schedule
for λ where we linearly increase it from λ/10 to λ dur-
ing the first 10 epochs. We employ both schemes since
they increase the stability of training with MMR.
In order to determine the best set of hyperparame-
ters λ, γB , and γD of MMR, we perform a grid search
over them for every dataset and network architecture.
In particular, we empirically found that the optimal
values of γB and γD are equal and are usually 1.5-2
times higher than the  of robust error. All the re-
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ported MMR models and the final set of hyperparame-
ters can be found at https://github.com/max-andr/
provable-robustness-max-linear-regions.
In order to make a comparison to the robust training of
[32] we either take their publicly available models or re-
train them using their code. For the main experiments,
we set the parameter for KW training equal to the 
for which we check the robust error. For experiments
where robustness is evaluated as average lower bound
(see Section 5.2), we performed a grid search over the
radius of the l2-norm used in their robust loss, aiming
at a model with non-trivial lower bounds with little or
no loss in test error.
We perform adversarial training using the PGD attack
of [19] with 50% clean and 50% adversarial examples
in every batch. For the l2-norm, we adapted the im-
plementation from [23] to perform the gradient update
normalized by its l2 norm, instead of the gradient sign
(which corresponds to l∞-norm and thus irrelevant for
l2 case) on every iteration. We use the same l2-bound
on the perturbation as the  used in robust error. Dur-
ing training, we perform 40 iterations of the PGD
attack for MNIST and F-MNIST, and 7 for GTS and
CIFAR-10. During evaluation, we use 40 iterations for
all datasets. The step size is selected as  divided by
the number of iterations and multiplied by 2.
We use the untargeted formulation of the Carlini-
Wagner l2 attack in order to evaluate the upper bounds
on the l2-norm required to change the class. We use
the settings provided in the original paper [6] and in
their code, including 20 iterations of the binary search,
10000 iterations of the optimizer, learning rate 0.01
and initial constant of 0.001. For the Mixed Integer
Programming evaluation we use the library of [29] with
the settings of [35], which we obtained via private cor-
respondence. Namely, we use Gurobi as the back-end,
LP as the tightening algorithm, and we set 5s timeout
for the presolver, and 120s timeout for the main solver.
C Further experiments
Comparison to Cross-Lipschitz regularization:
We also consider models trained with Cross-Lipschitz
regularization of [13] since they also consider the ro-
bustness wrt the l2 norm. We evaluated upper bounds
on the robust error of MNIST-FC1 models using the
method of [32], which gives tighter bounds than the
original Cross-Lipschitz guarantee of [13]. As a result,
their most provably robust model obtained test error
of 1.38%, and the robust error bounded between 2.5%
given by the PGD attack and 7.2% by [32]. Thus we
can observe that Cross-Lipschitz regularization also en-
hances certifiability in this case since the upper bound
is significantly better than the one for adversarial train-
ing, 16.9%. However, both KW and MMR+at provide
a better upper bound on robust error, 5.2% and 6.4%
respectively.
Comparison of lower bounds: In Table 4 we com-
pare, for fully connected models, the lower bounds on
the distance to the decision boundary computed by [32]
and our technique using Theorem 3.1 with integration
of box constraints once just checking the initial linear
region Q(x) where the point x lies versus also checking
neighboring linear regions. We see that [32] obtain bet-
ter lower bounds, this is why we use their method for
the main evaluation of provable robustness in Table 1.
Nevertheless, the gap is not too large and while the
lower bounds are worse, the achieved robustness using
our MMR regularization is mostly better as shown in
Table 1.
Analysing l2-robustness with different metrics:
We want here to repeat the experiment of Section 5
wrt l2-norm but evaluating robustness as the average
norm of the perturbation necessary to change the clas-
sification of a point. We can compute for every input
a lower bound on the l2-norm of the minimal adversar-
ial perturbation thanks to the method of [32] and an
upper bound with CW-attack [6]. However, when our
technique (Theorem 3.1) provides the optimal solution,
we set both lower and upper bounds to this value.
We report test error of the model and the average lower
and upper bounds in Tables 5 and 6, computed on
1000 points of the test set. For KW, MMR and MMR
+ adversarial training we report the solutions which
achieve similar test error than the plain model.
There are several interesting observations. First of all,
while adversarial training improves the upper bounds
compared to the plain setting often quite significantly,
the lower bounds almost never improve, often they get
even worse. This is in contrast to the methods, KW and
our MMR, which optimize the robustness guarantees.
For MMR we see in all cases significant improvements
of the lower bounds over plain and adversarial training,
for KW this is also true but the improvements on GTS
are much smaller. Notably, for the fully connected
networks FC1 and FC10 on GTS and F-MNIST , the
lower bounds achieved by MMR and/or MMR+at are
larger than the upper bounds of the plain training for
F-MNIST and better than plain and adversarial train-
ing as well as KW on GTS. Thus MMR is provably
more robust than the competing methods in these con-
figurations. Moreover, the achieved lower bounds of
MMR are only worse than the ones of KW on MNIST
for FC10. Also for the achieved upper bounds MMR
is most of the time better than KW and always im-
proves over adversarial training. For the CNNs the
improvements of KW and MMR over plain and adver-
sarial training in terms of lower and upper bounds are
smaller than for the fully connected networks and it is
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Table 4: Lower bounds computed by our method. We report here for the fully connected models trained with either MMR or MMR+at
the lower bounds computed by our technique, that is exploiting Theorem 3.1 and integrating box constraints without and with checking
additional neighboring regions (improved lower bounds) versus KW [32].
KW [32] Theorem 3.1 our improved
dataset model test error lower bounds lower bounds lower bounds
MNIST
FC1 MMR 1.51% 0.69 0.22 0.29
FC1 MMR+at 1.59% 0.70 0.25 0.33
FC10 MMR 1.87% 0.48 0.31 0.33
FC10 MMR+at 1.35% 0.40 0.21 0.26
GTS
FC1 MMR 11.15% 0.69 0.69 0.69
FC1 MMR+at 11.72% 0.72 0.72 0.72
FC10 MMR 12.82% 0.64 0.63 0.63
FC10 MMR+at 13.36% 0.64 0.63 0.63
F-MNIST
FC1 MMR 10.22% 0.50 0.30 0.41
FC1 MMR+at 10.94% 0.66 0.33 0.42
FC10 MMR 11.73% 0.68 0.56 0.64
FC10 MMR+at 11.39% 0.67 0.53 0.60
Table 5: Comparison of different methods regarding robustness wrt l2-norm. We here report the statistics of 5 different training
schemes: plain (usual training), at (adversarial training [19]), MMR (ours), MMR+at (MMR plus adversarial training) and KW (the robust
training introduced in [32]). We show test error (TE), average of lower (LB) and upper (UB) bounds on the robustness ‖δ‖2, where δ is the
solution of (1). The robustness statistics are computed on the first 1000 points of the respective test sets (including misclassified images)
against all the possible target classes.
l2-norm robustness
dataset training FC1 FC10 CNNscheme TE(%) LB UB TE(%) LB UB TE(%) LB UB
MNIST
plain 1.59 0.34 0.98 1.81 0.13 0.70 0.97 0.04 1.03
at 1.29 0.25 1.23 0.93 0.14 1.59 0.86 0.14 1.67
KW 1.37 0.70 1.75 1.69 0.75 1.74 1.04 0.32 1.84
MMR 1.51 0.69 1.69 1.87 0.48 1.48 1.17 0.38 1.70
MMR+at 1.59 0.70 1.70 1.35 0.40 1.60 1.14 0.38 1.86
GTS
plain 12.24 0.33 0.57 11.25 0.08 0.48 6.73 0.06 0.43
at 13.55 0.34 0.66 13.01 0.10 0.56 8.12 0.06 0.53
KW 13.06 0.35 0.63 13.56 0.16 0.52 8.44 0.11 0.52
MMR 11.15 0.69 0.69 12.82 0.64 0.67 7.40 0.09 0.59
MMR+at 11.72 0.72 0.72 13.36 0.64 0.66 10.50 0.11 0.62
F-MNIST
plain 9.61 0.18 0.53 10.53 0.05 0.44 8.86 0.03 0.32
at 9.89 0.11 1.00 9.89 0.11 1.00 8.77 0.07 0.80
KW 9.95 0.46 1.11 11.42 0.47 1.22 10.37 0.17 0.96
MMR 10.22 0.50 0.85 11.73 0.68 1.18 10.30 0.17 0.88
MMR+at 10.94 0.66 1.45 11.39 0.67 1.24 10.48 0.21 1.14
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Table 6: Comparison of different training schemes wrt l2-
norm. We here report the statistics relative to models trained with
5 different training scheme: plain (usual training), at (adversarial
training [19]), MMR (ours), MMR+at (the two methods combined)
and KW (the robust training introduced in [32]). We show test
error, average of lower and upper bounds on ‖δ‖2, where δ is the
solution of problem (1). The statistics are computed on the first
1000 points of the test set (including misclassified images) against
all the possible target classes.
l2-norm robustness on CIFAR-10
training CNN
scheme TE(%) LB UB
plain 25.98 0.02 0.16
at 25.36 0.04 0.42
KW 41.52 0.16 0.66
MMR 41.86 0.16 0.39
MMR+at 41.11 0.13 0.57
harder to maintain similar test performance. The dif-
ferences between KW and MMR for the lower bounds
are very small so that for CNNs both robust methods
perform on a similar level.
D Visualizing the structure of
provably robust models
Here we analyse the effect of MMR regularization on
the gradient of cross entropy loss wrt the input and
on the structure of the convolutional filters. We focus
on models trained for l∞-robustness on MNIST, GTS,
and CIFAR-10. We provide the plain and adversarially
trained model as reference.
In Figures 5, 7, 9 we visualize the gradients computed
for 10 images of the corresponding test sets (shown
in the first row) for the different training procedures.
For MNIST, zero values are represented in white, neg-
ative in blue and positive in red, where every image is
rescaled independently. For GTS and CIFAR-10, we
follow [30] and clip the gradient values to ±3 standard
deviations and then rescale them to [0, 1]d. We visual-
ize models obtained with plain training (second row),
adversarial training [19] (third), KW robust training
[32] (fourth), MMR (fifth), MMR + adversarial train-
ing (last row).
Figures 6, 8, 10 show the structure of the weights of the
filters of the two convolutional layers. The top five rows
are the filters from the first layer, either all of them
for MNIST, or the first five for GTS and CIFAR-10
(reshaped from 4×4×3 to 4×12). The bottom five are
the filters from the second convolution layer (reshaped
from 4× 4× 16 to 16× 16). We present the filters for
plain training (first and sixth row), adversarial training
[19] (second and seventh), KW robust training [32]
(third and eighth), MMR (fourth and ninth), MMR
+ adversarial training (fifth and last row). The white
color corresponds to zero weights, and the farther the
value is from zero, the more intense is the color. Note
that each row is also scaled independently.
MNIST (Figures 5, 6): As noted in [30], adversarial
training leads to more interpretable gradients that fo-
cus on salient features of the digits. All robust training
schemes have the effect of creating both interpretable
and sparse gradients, which is reasonable considering
that a sparse gradient implies that there are less direc-
tions along which abrupt variations in the value of the
loss are possible. While KW model seems to highlight
more the borders of the images, MMR models have the
most concentrated gradients.
In line with what has been reported in [19, 32], the
filters of adversarially trained and provably robust mod-
els (Figure 6) have significantly higher sparsity than
the plain model. Interestingly, in contrast to the others,
MMR models preserve sparsity also in the filters on the
second convolutional layer. This seems to be important
for obtaining tight certificates by the KW method and
for fast verification with the MIP solver.
GTS (Figures 7, 8): For GTS we also observe that
all robust training schemes lead to a qualitatively dif-
ferent behaviour of the gradient. In particular, the
models become less sensitive to variations of the back-
ground, and instead they highlight more the traffic
signs. We observe that the gradients for the MMR and
adversarially trained models are the most interpretable.
We note that the similarity between the gradients of
the KW model and MMR+at is possibly due to their
similar test error and robustness (Table 1).
Similarly to MNIST, we observe that the convolutional
filters are sparser for the adversarially trained model
than for the plain model. The filters of KW and MMR
models are the sparsest, while MMR+at is less sparse
and resembles more the adversarially trained model.
CIFAR-10 (Figures 9, 10): First of all, we note that
the considered shallow CNNs are not able to achieve
very low clean test error (the best is 24.63% for the
plain model and 34.61% for provably robust models).
This may explain why we cannot observe interpretable
gradients as clearly as in [30] even for the adversarially
trained model. However, we note that the gradients
for the robustly trained models are still qualitatively
different from the plain model. While the gradients of
the plain model just consist of high-frequency noise,
e.g. the MMR model concentrates more on the objects
rather than on the background.
For the convolutional filters of the CIFAR-10 models,
we make conclusions similar to GTS. In particular,
the filters of KW and MMR models are the sparsest,
while MMR+at is less sparse and is more similar to
the adversarially trained model.
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Figure 5: Gradient of l∞-robust models. We visualize the gradients of the cross entropy loss wrt the input for different images of
MNIST test set for every model: plain training, adversarial training [19], KW robust training [32], MMR, MMR + adversarial training. We
can see for robust models the gradients are much sparser, while only for plain training it does not clearly highlights relevant features.
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Figure 6: Filters of l∞-robust models. We visualize all the filters of the first convolutional layer (first five rows) and 16 filters of the
second layer (last five rows) for every MNIST model (trained for l∞-robustness): plain training, adversarial training [19], KW robust training
[32], MMR, MMR + adversarial training. We can see that MMR and MMR+at leads to very sparse filters, especially in the second layer.
Note that each row is rescaled independently.
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Figure 7: Gradient of l∞-robust models. We visualize the gradients of the cross entropy loss wrt the input for different images of GTS
test set (first row) for every model: plain training, adversarial training [19], KW robust training [32], MMR, MMR + adversarial training.
We can see for robust models the gradients are much sparser, while only for plain training it does not clearly highlights relevant features.
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Figure 8: Filters of l∞-robust models. We visualize the first five filters of the first convolutional layer (first five rows) and 16 filters
of the second layer (last five rows) for every GTS model (trained for l∞-robustness): plain training, adversarial training [19], KW robust
training [32], MMR, MMR + adversarial training. We can see that MMR leads to sparser filters, especially in the second layer. Note that
each row is rescaled independently.
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Figure 9: Gradient of l∞-robust models. We visualize the gradients of the cross entropy loss wrt the input for different images of
CIFAR-10 test set for every model: plain training, adversarial training [19], KW robust training [32], MMR, MMR + adversarial training.
We can see for robust models the gradients are sparser than for plain training and they tend to highlight relevant features of the images.
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Figure 10: Filters of l∞-robust models. We visualize the first five filters of the first convolutional layer (first five rows) and 16 filters of
the second layer (last five rows) for every CIFAR-10 model (trained for l∞-robustness): plain training, adversarial training [19], KW robust
training [32], MMR, MMR + adversarial training. We can see that MMR and KW lead to sparser filters, especially in the second layer. Note
that each row is rescaled independently.
